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ARTICLES
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT*
CARL H. ESBECK**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Although government intervention in religious affairs is a new
and understandably worrisome experience for many American
churches, history instructs us that the confrontation is not novel.
We can find some comfort in the fact that this double wrestle
of state with church and state with individual believers is a perennial match. After all, it has been nearly sixty years since a brutish
measure in Oregon making parochial school education unlawful
had to be sidelined by the United States Supreme Court in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.' Over forty-five years ago the Supreme Court
decided Lovell v. City of Griffin, 2 snuffing out a practice by which
municipalities were using ordinances prohibiting the distribution
of handbills without a permit to run off proselytizing Jehovah's
Witnesses.
From a review of the last decade's cases, what does appear
to be new is that for the first time the instances of government
intervention affect the mainstream Protestant establishment. No
longer does the state struggle only with Roman Catholics, the
separatistic Anabaptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and
others who at times found themselves in the role of "minority
sect." The line of confrontation has shifted and the antagonists
* This paper was first presented before the National Council of
Churches' conference on Government Intervention in Religious Affairs at New
York City on September 12-14, 1984.
" Copyright 1984 by Carl H. Esbeck.
**
Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D., 1974,
Cornell University; B.S., 1971, Iowa State University.
1. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
2. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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have regrouped along a broader front. It is no longer sect versus
state. Now all religious groups including traditional denominations are finding a state increasingly uninformed, indeed, insensitive, to the unique nature and role of church and parachurch
ministries.
A.

The Old Alliance

This state of affairs has come about because an old alliance
is crumbling. For many years, those who have sought to use the
state to advance ecclesiastical goals have been successfully opposed
in the courts by two groups. First, there are those who argue
for the increased privatization of religion, harboring a conviction
that religion is largely irrelevant and often divisive in matters of
government. The fissures opened within the body politic by
sectarian quarrels and even wars, past and present, are cited as
proof that religion is dysfunctional in the public square and,
therefore, must be shunted to the privacy and relative obscurity
of home and family. 3 Members of this first group, which shall
be referred to as "secularists," are the descendants of rationalists
and deists, which numbered among some of America's prominent Founding Fathers. Today the secularlists' ranks are swollen
by certain ethnic and religious minorities who genuinely fear
discrimination and other forms of intolerance should Christian
majorities bear in any serious way on public policy and matters
4
of state.
The second partner in this old alliance posits its support foursquare on a biblical theology that commands not only freedom
for religiously based conscience but also the separation of church
and state. These religionists desire a benevolent separation of the
institutions of church and state, but not one characterized by
hostility or even indifference between the two. 5 They shall be
termed "institutional-separationists."
Secularists view the utility of religion as strictly personal. They
fear religion as a potential threat to domestic peace and civil
government. Institutional-separationists, on the other hand, are
3.
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characterized by a desire to protect the independence of churches
and the voluntary nature of religious conversion and practice by
shunning any interdependence of church and state. Volunteerism
is mandated by their very understanding of true religion. To be
a voluntaristic church and to be a church free of both government's help and hindrance is, they argue, a unitary concept. Each
implies the other, and both are made possible by the structural
disentangling of church and state.
In the eighteenth century, American rationalists-students of
the Enlightenment in its milder form-and religious enthusiasts,
whose numbers were greatly increased by the revivals of the First
Great Awakening (1730's-1750's), combined forces on the practical outworkings of religious liberty against the older established
churches. This alliance between rationalists and religious enthusiasts (principally Baptists, "new side" Presbyterians, "new
light" Congregationalists, Dutch Reformed, and Anglicans later
identified with Methodism) was possible because both sought the
same end result, namely independent churches in a nonsectarian
state. 6 Their reasons for seeking this arrangement, however, were
quite different. The religionists sought religious liberty. To them
this meant deposing the established churches that, in their linkage
to the state, had become cold and formalistic. The rationalists
acted on a different purpose. Some were anti-clerical, but nearly
all were pro-religion. To rationalists, religion served the utilitarian
function of infusing society with the necessary morality to make
self-government possible. Nevertheless, disestablishment was sought
by these rationalists to avoid sectarian strife and promote domestic
peace.
So why is this old coalition that held for years and stood against
those who threatened religious liberty now breaking up? Their
common cause held so long as the debate in the courts focused
6. Historical accounts of the emergence of religious liberty including
the separation of church and state are found in S. COBB, THE RISE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); W. GEWEHR, THE GREAT AWAKENING
IN VIRGINIA,

1740-1790 (1930); E.

GREENE,
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(1962); W.

(1941); F.

(1964); C. MAXSON, THE
(1920); S. MEAD, THE LIVELY
IN AMERICA (1963); 1 A. STOKES,
(1950); W. SWEET, RELIGION IN

THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA
GREAT AWAKENING IN THE MIDDLE COLONIES
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COLONIAL AMERICA
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HeinOnline -- 4 Pub. L. Forum 327 1985

PUBLIC LAW FORUM

[Vol. 4:325

on keeping ecclesiastical interests from capturing the instruments
and power of state. Now that the intensity of first amendment
litigation has shifted to include issues of keeping the state from
interfering with religious affairs, secularists and institutionalseparationists find themselves on opposite sides of the courtroom.
Institutional-separationists have always held to the reciprocal
nature of church-state separation: the church did not capture the
state and concomitantly the state did not entangle itself in the
affairs of the church. It is the secularists who have changed. Unlike
the rationalists in the eighteenth century, secularists of modern
bent devalue the utility of traditional religion for instilling the
moral base and common vision necessary to hold a free society
together. Indeed, some secularists view religion as a reactionary
7
force retarding the moral evolution that they deem desirable.
Today, confronted with the claim that the state is interfering
with church affairs, secularists demur. Indeed, they label as
"favoritism" any claim by religious groups for exemption from
government regulation. Secularists simply do not share the
institutional-separationists' concern for the integrity and vitality
of the church. At its root, secularists view a church as nothing
more than a collection of individuals having no greater rights than
the aggregate liberties of its individual members. In sharp contrast, institutional-separationists hold to a theological concept of
the church as a spiritual body founded and commissioned by God.
The church is understood as the New Society through which a
living God advances certain purposes and channels His redemptive grace. Consequently, the church cannot be treated
sociologically as merely another voluntary association. 8
The issue which divides, then, is that secularists do not give
assent to the divine origin and nature of the church. As the
secularists' thinking has worked its way into the policies of the
state-and it undeniably has to a marked degree-the state through
its offices and laws has come to regard churches sociologically
rather than spiritually. Thus, today when churches venture out
beyond the hallowed building under the steeple, they are dealt
the same governmental treatment as their so-called "secular
counterparts." Any request for exemption from general legislation is greeted with incredulity as if the church is proposing an
7.
8.
RELIGION,

Dunphy, supra note 3.
Richardson, Civil Religion in Theological Perspective, in
161, 178-80 (Richey & Jones, ed. 1974).
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unthinkable and novel privilege. On occasion, exemption from
regulation is rejected on the basis that it would constitute an
establishment of religion contrary to the first amendment. 9 Thus,
separation of church and state, which began in part to protect
the church, ironically is turned on its head and becomes a tool
for confining the church.
B.

Two Fundamentals

This ought to rivet home something very basic: one's view
of the appropriate relationship between church and state begins
with one's ecclesiology (What is the church?) and one's philosophy
or theology of the state (What is the purpose and jurisdiction of
government?). Fundamentally, the initial question is not whether
we have correctly construed the language of the first amendment
as it was drafted by Congress in 1789. Nor is it what Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison or other prominent statesmen thought
about church-state arrangements. Nor is the question whether
America was a "Christian Nation" in origin. At its root one's
opinion of church-state relations is dependent on one's theological
or philosophical world view. Only when this is admitted can we
start being honest about why American views on the appropriate
relationship of church and state are as varied as we are pluralistic
(one might also say "as we are confused") in our religious and
philosophical allegiances.
This point could be a spoiler. After all, our civil courts will
never arrive at a satisfactory consensus concerning church and
state if first they must delve into such questions as the nature
and role of the church. 10 However, a second fundamental shows
the way out of this seeming dilemma: the Constitution is to be
read to avoid these questions altogether. People frequently make
the mistake of equating what is constitutional with what is prudent
9. See, e.g., Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 728
F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding a Virginia child-care center licensing statute
which exempts centers operated by religious groups overbroad and violative
of Establishment Clause). See also infra note 49 and accompanying text.
10. The weight of opinion is against the civil courts becoming entangled
in defining such terms as "religion" and "church," not only because of the
practical difficulties, but also to shield religious freedom. See, e.g., Freeman,
The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion. " 71 GEo. L.
J. 1519 (1983); Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REv. 579; Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious Institutions" Under the
First Amendment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 313 (1980); Wheland, "Church" in the
Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885 (1977).
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or wise in their own judgment. This misconceives the nature of
a constitution in a republic. Within the body politic, the Constitution orders a few important relationships in a few important
respects. The separation of powers doctrine is the best known example. The Constitution does not profess to be a document which
resolves all questions of political and social ethics for all time.
The document leaves most issues of public ethics for resolution
in the marketplace of ideas, while preserving minority interests
and inalienable rights in the decision-making process.
The Constitution deals with the church-state issue through this
structural relationship and thereby avoids having civil courts
become ensnarled in defining the church, the appropriate purview
of its ministry, its allocation or utilization of resources, and other
inherently theological questions. Whatever ministry a particular
church should define for itself, the Constitution limits the nature
and scope of the government's interaction with that ministry.
Therefore, the task of the civil courts is not that of moral
philosopher or theologian, but the vastly simpler job of a referee
preventing any excessive entanglements between church and state.
The goal of church-state separation is for each to give the other
sufficient breathing space. The Constitution, then, specifies
particular spheres of authority. Both church and state have limited
competence to act in that sphere reserved for the other."
C.

Thesis

The first amendment contains two clauses dealing expressly
with religion: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. 12 It is the thesis of this paper that the guarantees of these
two clauses are quite different. The Free Exercise Clause functions like other provisions in the Constitution that protect individual liberties. Its purpose is to stand against governmental
abuse of an individual's inalienable rights. Like other preferred
freedoms, free will in religious matters is highly prized. Therefore,
in the balance of societal versus individual interests, the scale is
weighted in favor of individual choice in matters of religious belief.
The Establishment Clause has a very different thrust. Unlike
11.
REVIEW

See J. ELY,
94 (1980); R.

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 129-38

(1981).
12.

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .

. .

."

U.S. Const. amend. 1.
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the other provisions of the first amendment which protect
individual liberties, the Establishment Clause focuses on a structural concern, namely, governing the church-state relationship..
The state must be nonsectarian or neutral. Government must not
favor any particular church or creedal teaching over another; nor
may it favor the religious over those who profess no religious
beliefs. The Establishment Clause regiments the nature and degree
of involvement between government and religious organizations.
When this involvement is unmarked by institutional dependency,
the courts need not concern themselves with divergent views on
ecclesiology and the appropriate scope of church ministry. The
nature and scope of church activities will be defined by each
religious body according to its own light. By acknowledging a
limitation on any mutual dependence between church and state,
the unique nature of religious entities is recognized and preserved
by the Establishment Clause. This uniqueness prohibits churches
from being treated like other voluntary associations that may enjoy government's largess and incur its regulation.
II.

A

GENERAL THEORY OF RELIGIoUs

LIBERTY

A complete theory of religious liberty includes more than ordering church-state relations and protecting religious-based conscience.
There must also be freedom of expression and assembly for both
the individual believer and religious organizations. The current
case law of the federal courts embracing all of these concerns can
usefully be organized into three doctrinal subparts:
1. The necessity for government to respect religiously based
conscience (often stated in the negative as religious toleration and
the allowance for civil disobedience), presently addressed in the
courts under the Free Exercise Clause;
2. The appropriate relationship between church and state
(popularly termed the separation of church and state), presently
addressed in the courts under the Establishment Clause; and
3. Freedom of religious expression and association, presently addressed in the courts under the Speech, Press, Assembly and
Petition Clauses.
These three-respect for conscience, institutional separation
of church and state, and freedom of religious expression-in sum
comprise a general theory of religious liberty rooted in the first
amendment, at least liberty from abusive government as distinct
from wholly private offenses.
HeinOnline -- 4 Pub. L. Forum 331 1985
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The Free Exercise Clause

Governmental respect for individual conscience grounded in
religious belief is required by the Free Exercise Clause.1 3 There
are three steps in every cause of action brought under this clause.
First, a claimant must show that his or her religious belief is
sincerely held. 14 The sincerity requirement, however, involves an
attenuated inquiry because of the injunction against civil courts
conducting inquests concerning an individual's faith.' 5 Thus, the
Supreme Court has said that religious claims must border on the
16
"bizarre" before they can be refused credence by the courts.
Stated differently, the sincerity requirement is not concerned with
the reasonableness of what a claimant believes, but whether he
or she really believes it-a "fervency test."
Second, a free exercise claimant must show coercion of
conscience,1 7 a difficult requirement. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has held that coercion is present in more instances than
just the situations involving state prohibitions of religious conduct or state requirements of conduct that are contrary to faith.
Burdens which only indirectly require the claimant to make a
"cruel choice" between faith and obedience to government will
suffice:
13. Only religiously based freedom of conscience is protected by the
Free Exercise Clause. Dissent or acts of civil disobedience, however sincere
or motivated by deeply held concerns, which are not grounded in one's religion
are simply not addressed by the clause and would not demand a constitutionally required exemption from the law. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S.
707, 713 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972); but see
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 465-66 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the first amendment implies a right of conscience whatever
the motivation).
14. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at 714-15.
15. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
16. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at 714-15. Until Thomas it
was thought that the Court also required a claimant to show that the belief
was central to his or her faith. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at
218; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). It is now clear, however,
that centrality-the importance a particular denomination places on the given
activity-is not required. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at 715-16; United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
17. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); see
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1980). Moreover, it is no defense
for the state to claim that the burden on free exercise is "indirect" or "incidential." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21; Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. at 404.
HeinOnline -- 4 Pub. L. Forum 332 1985
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Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such
a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.18
Finally, once the sincerity and coercion elements are shown,
the burden of proof shifts to the state. At this point, the free
exercise claimant prevails except in those rare instances in which
the state can demonstrate that the societal interests at stake are
compelling and cannot be achieved by other means which would
be less restrictive to conscience. 19
When the facts permitted it to do so, the Supreme Court has
decided cases concerning the free exercise of religion on the alternative first amendment guarantees of free expression and
association. 20 For example, the guarantees of freedom of speech
and press afford the same degree of protection to the distribution
of a religious tract as a political pamphlet. Preventing the distribution of religious material also violates the Free Exercise Clause,
but often the Court has chosen not to reach this question. Thus,
individual religious liberty is often subsumed under the more
broadly applicable expressional rights. 21 This has had the practical effect of confining the operation of the Free Exercise Clause
to the protection of religious diversity through the toleration of
minority religious practices. All of the Supreme Court's recent
free exercise cases arise in the context of a religious claimant's
desired exemption from the application of general legislation, the
legislation being religiously neutral "on its face." Accordingly,

18. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at 717-18. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
19. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (first articulated the state's heavy
burden).
20. For example, religious belief has been protected as an aspect of
the general guarantee of freedom of thought, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (sustaining claim by Jehovah's Witness that state requirement that motor vehicle license plate bear the motto "Live Free or Die"
violates freedom of thought guarantee which includes the "right to refrain from
speaking at all"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (religious
test for public office invades "freedom of belief and religion"); United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 ("Freedom of thought, which includes freedom
of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men."); West Va. Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compulsory flag salute and pledge
of allegiance invades the "sphere of intellect and spirit").
21. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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the Court's few opinions based wholly on the Free Exercise Clause
have been concerned with such discrete religious minorities as
24
Sabbatarians, 22 pacifists, 23 and the Old Order Amish.
Currently there is no disagreement between secularists and
institutional-separationists concerning the Supreme Court's level
of protection for an individual's free exercise of religion, although
again their premises are different. Secularists defend individual
rights on the basis of a self-contained, inherent dignity of persons, with reason and conscience as defining characteristics.
Institutional-separationists attribute individual rights to the human
status as creatures touched by the imago Dei.25 In short, the
secularist is anthropocentric and enthrones individual conscience,
while the institutional-separationist is theocentric and derives individual rights from the relationship of humans to God the creator.
There is no quarrel over the desired result: substantial protection
for the religiously informed conscience. However, when the issue
concerns government interference with religious organizations, the
differences between secularists and institutional-separationists are
full-blown.

B.

Reconciling the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses

The element of coercion provides a useful opening to
distinguish the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. In

Abington School District v. Schempp, the Court stated:
[The] purpose [of the Free Exercise Clause] is to secure religious
liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof
by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case
for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates
against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment
Clause violation need not be so attended. 26
22. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (Seventh-day Adventist);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Orthodox Jew).
23. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (Jehovah's Witness);

Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (conscientious objector and Selective
Service Act); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (same); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (same).
24. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205.
25.

P.

MARSHALL, HUMAN RIGHTS THEORIES IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE

(1983).
26. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223. See also Board
of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (no free exercise violation
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The requirement that a claim be predicated on coercion prevents
the Free Exercise Clause from becoming a ready excuse for a
citizen to avoid many unwanted obligations that he or she owes
to the state.
If a successful free exercise claim did not require a clear showing of coercion of conscience, contending claimants could paralyze
government. Consider the problem that would result if a pacifist
could successfully enjoin a government's defense buildup because
it violates his or her views on war. If a pacifist has a valid claim
that defense spending must be halted because it violates his or
her religious-based conscience, then likewise a fundamentalist
Christian has a free exercise right to demand more defense spending in accord with his or her religious beliefs in a "strong
America." The government's power to act would be frozen between these contending religious dogmas, and all because the Free
Exercise Clause is not limited to instances of personal coercion.
From this example, it is apparent that there can be no free exercise right to compel a government to always act in accord with
one's conscience. The most a pacifist can insist on under the Free
Exercise Clause is a conscientious objector exemption from personally engaging in military duties. Affording the pacifist the option
of alternative civilian service obviates the "cruel choice" of bearing arms contrary to religious faith, and that is all that is required of a government which respects diverse religious beliefs.
An Establishment Clause claim need not be attended by
coercion of conscience. 2 7 The task of the clause is to mediate the
relations of church and state. It is possible for either church or
state to transgress the precincts of the other without causing coercion of a person's conscience. Nevertheless, in such cases the
Establishment Clause is violated. 28 For example, most would agree
that the Establishment Clause would be transgressed should Congress appropriate money to supplement the salaries of all Lutheran
pastors. Yet, there is no coercion in such an arrangement. No
person is prohibited from doing anything they believe their faith
in absence of claim by plaintiffs that statute in question coerced them as
individuals in the practice of their religion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,

430 (1962) ("The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.").

27. 374 U.S. at 223.
28. Howe, The ConstitutionalQuestion in
49, 50-55 (1958).

RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY
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requires, nor are they pressured to do something which is against
their religion. The most an individual claimant (presumably a
non-Lutheran) can complain about is that he or she objects in
principle to paying taxes into general federal revenues when a
small fraction of those revenues go to support the clergy of a faith
he or she does not share. This does not state a free exercise claim,
however, for there is no general guarantee that a person's taxes
will only be used in ways compatible with his or her beliefs,
religious or otherwise.
It was this very lack of an aggrieved individual that prompted
the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen29 to allow taxpayers to sue
the government in Establishment Clause cases. To permit such
a claim required a deviation from traditional standing rules because
the clause, rather than directly protecting individual rights, structures the relations between the two institutions of church and state.
Yet, unless the Court afforded individual taxpayers standing to
sue, the violation would be nonjusticiable and thus uncorrectable
by the judiciary.
Numerous other examples can be found distinguishing the
religion clauses. In Abington School District v. Schempp, 30 Bible reading
in the public schools was in question. The Supreme Court held
that the claimants (students and parents) could challenge the practice under the Establishment Clause without testifying as to the
coercive effect of the practice on students. The Court did not
require proof that individual religious conscience was infringed,
as would be required in a free exercise claim. To challenge the
state's action under the Establishment Clause, the record on appeal was sufficient if it merely showed that the students and parents
were assigned to schools where Bible reading took place. 31 The
Schempp case struck down the Bible reading practice, but not
because the student's free exercise of religion was infringed. Probably some coercion in the form of peer pressure was present
even though the record did not show it, but that was beside the
point. Bible reading was prohibited in Schempp because it assigned to the state such sectarian duties as religious propagation and
inculcation. Maintenance of the proper relationship between church
32
and state leaves this task to the church.
29. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (restricting Flast test; but the point
made in the text concerning the Establishment Clause is still valid).
30. 374 U.S. 203.
31. Id. at 224 n.9.
32. Id.
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1.

Tension Between the Clauses?

The misconception that the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses are in constant tension has been a setback for religious
liberty. The problem stems from a simplistic but wrongheaded
notion that the Free Exercise Clause is pro-religion and the
Establishment Clause is anti-religion in the sense that the latter's
sole task is preventing governmental support of religion. If one
were to follow this construction, these two clauses would be at
war with each other in every first amendment case involving
religion. The judicial task, then, would be to determine if the
Establishment Clause eclipses free exercise (in which case the antireligious forces prevail) or if free exercise prevails over establishment (producing a win for religion). This line of reasoning is
fallacious. First, this view is not an analytical test at all. Rather,
the face-off between the clauses construct would become a matter
of ad hoc balancing without any guidance to the judge concerning
how to weigh the competing interests. Second, this clauses-intension reasoning presumes that congressional authors of the first
amendment placed side by side two phrases which contradicted
each other. It would be as if the selfsame statesman had written,
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of the
press, but Congress may censor all newspapers for reasons it deems
sufficient." The inclusion of such an intentional, built-in contradiction is highly improbable.
The matter of reconciling the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses is clear. Both clauses advance religious liberty. The Free
Exercise Clause protects a person's religiously informed conscience.
Concomitantly, like other structural provisions in the Constitution, the Establishment Clause imposes an ordering of church and
33
state that eventually inures to the benefit of individual freedom.
Structural separation ensures that a believer's church is free of
state control and that a believer's (or skeptic's) government does
not promote a creed that he or she does not share.
It is not Orwellian doublespeak to construe the noEstablishment Clause, which superficially appears directed against
only government support of religion, to also preventing government interference with religious organizations. Due to the volun33. See Justice Brennan's comments in Schempp justifying the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the fourteenth amendment as an individual
"liberty" interest thus making it applicable to the states, id. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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taristic nature of religion, churches are harmed by state aid.
Government aid inevitably leads to dependence and control. The
church must resist the expedience of government support, for the
gain by the church is always short term.
Refreshingly, the Supreme Court has not been confused about
this matter. The second and third parts of the Establishment
Clause test require that governmental action not have the effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion (note the reciprocity), and that
34
such action not lead to excessive entanglement between the two.

In short, some separation of church and state, properly understood,
protects churches as well as the state, and consequently advances
the liberty of believer and nonbeliever alike.
2.

Verbal Maps

What does this mean for the Supreme Court's tripartite test
presently used in Establishment Clause cases? The three-part test
announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman35 should be reexamined, for the
Court's choice of language is ambigious in that the test is not
clearly tied to the ultimate goals of the institutional separation
of church and state. The Court's verbal map can be improved
upon, for it cannot be expected that every judge and lawyer will
have an in-depth appreciation of the foundational principles which
maximize religious liberty by ordering church-state relations. Simple formulations can be helpful. A formulation which folds the
three parts of the Lemon test into two elements and which chooses
better terminology is as follows:
First, the Establishment Clause requires that government be
neutral toward the confessional aspects of religion, but not indifferent and never hostile. Second, the Establishment Clause
prohibits government action which compromises the independence
or integrity of a religious organization, absent some truly exigent
threat to public health, safety, peace or order.
As with the Lemon test, under this proposed formulation both
the motive and the effects of the government's action are
34. For a view dissenting from the Court's reciprocity test and the thesis
here, see Riggs, Judicial Doublethink and the Establishment Clause: The Fallacy of
Establishment by Inhibition, 18 VAL. U.L. Rv. 285 (1984).
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The current test of the Establishment Clause
is: (a) the law must have a secular legislative purpose; (b) the principal or
primary effect of the law must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (c) the law must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with
religion. Id. at 612-13.
HeinOnline -- 4 Pub. L. Forum 338 1985

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

scrutinized. If the consequence of a government action is to foster
excessive entanglement with churches, the action would violate
the independence of the church. Discrimination among religious
groups or on the basis of one's religious affiliation (or lack thereof)
would be prohibited as contrary to the neutrality requirement,
for such unequal treatment would advance the interests of some
36
while inhibiting others.
In practice this proposal would frequently yield results no different from those under the existing three-part test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman. There would, however, be a good deal more logical
consistency with the literal language of the test. For example, many
recent attempts at government regulation of religious organizations by the Department of Labor, 3 7 National Labor Relations
Board, 38 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 39 and
36.

This is not a change from current case law. A statute which is

facially neutral and does not have a legislative history evidencing purposeful
discrimination, but the provisions of which happen to have a disparate impact
on members of different denominations, is constitutional when such distinctions result from the application of secular criteria. Gillette v. United States,
402 U.S. 437 (upholding a classification which differentiated on the basis of
religious belief, not by denominational or sect membership); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982) (charitable contributions statute unlawfully discriminates
against new religious movements).
37. See, e.g., St. Martin Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772 (1981) (federal unemployment compensation tax on religious schools). St.
Martin is very different from the recent Supreme Court decision in Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985), holding that federal
minimum wage and maximum hour legislation applied to the ordinary business
activities of a religious organization. Alamo Foundation was a religious outreach
to drug addicts, derelicts, and former criminals. In order to raise money for
its ministry, Alamo engaged in commercial activities for profit. The businesses
included service stations, retail clothing and grocery outlets, farms, construction, a motel, and candy production. The Supreme Court held that the
Establishment Clause was not violated by application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the commercial activities unrelated to Alamo's "evangelical activities." Clearly, if the FLSA was applied to religious endeavors, institutional
separation would be implicated. Alamo claimed that its commercial activities
were " 'churches in disguise'-vehicles for preaching and spreading the gospel
to the public." Id. at 1960. However, this factual assertion had been rejected
below and would not be disturbed by the Supreme Court at the appellate level.
It was this critical failure of proof by Alamo that caused the Establishment
Clause defense to be lost.
38. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979) (certification of bargaining unit of lay teachers in religious school).
39. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,
485 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 651 F.2d
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Internal Revenue Service 40 would be rebuffed by this proposed
test. The newest of nemeses, suits in tort for invasion of privacy
and emotional distress resulting from church discipline and suits
for clergy malpractice, would also be prohibited.4 1 Absent some
truly substantial threat to public health, safety, peace or order,
regulation of the internal operations of religious organizations compromises their integrity. State regulation of religious schools would
be permitted by the new test only to assure compliance with health
and safety standards, and to verify through attendance records
and achievement tests, that children are receiving an adequate
education. Any additional regulation would begin to compromise
the independence of religious schools. Finally, tax exemptions for
religious organizations, upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 42 are
easily reconciled with this proposed test. Not only is tax exemption of churches not an establishment violation, but exemption
is required by the Establishment Clause if churches are to remain free of state interference and control. The power to tax a
religious organization is the power to control it.
3.

What is the State to be Neutral About?

At what point has the state so entangled itself with a religious
organization that the group's very identify and vitality is
endangered? Given the complexity of our government and the
277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982); E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
40. See, e.g., Lutheran Social Services of Minnesota v. United States,
758 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1985) (striking down IRS regulation imposing more
onerous filing requirements on church-related social ministries than on
churches).
41. See Nally v. Grace Community Church, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912,
204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in clergy
malpractice claim), on remand, Nally v. Grace Community Church, No. NCC
18668-B (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., May 16, 1985) (motion for non-

suit granted for reasons of religious liberty and insufficient evidence); Guinn
v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, Okla., CT-81-929 (Tulsa, Okla. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 7, 1983) (court refused to dismiss action by church member for invasion
of privacy arising out of church disciplinary proceeding), appeal denied, No.
52, 623 (Okla. Mar. 1, 1983) (unpublished order), cert. denied sub nom., Church
of Christ of Collinsville v. Graham, 104 S. Ct. 85 (1983), on remand, Guinn
v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, Okla., CT-81-929 (Tulsa, Okla. Dist. Ct.
Mar. 15, 1984) (judgment for $390,000 following jury verdict), appeal docketed
No. 62154 (Okla. Apr. 16, 1984).
42. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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religious plurality of our society, the matter of institutional jurisdiction is so fraught with ambiguities that precise formulation is not
possible. Nevertheless, reasonable distinctions must be made, for
the conflicts have already overtaken us in the form of litigation.
Concededly, religious organizations alone are competent to define
the requirements of fulfilling their calling or mission. The state
cannot dictate the work of the church. Every religious organization, however, views its role differently: some are insular from
society while others are very interactive with public life. How does
a government act in an amicable manner in its relations with
all religious organizations and still carry out its own public policy
43
goals in a uniform, nondiscriminatory fashion?
Two levels of religious activities can be discerned, although
in practice they defy exactitude. First, when the American
experiment with institutional separation required that churches
be cut free of the state, the unique activities of worship and the
propagation and inculcation of their understanding of ultimate
truth (their creed or confession of faith) were to be without government support. These activities were understood to be central to
the very life of a religious organization, and government should
have no control over or involvement with them whatsoever absent
compelling reasons of the very highest order.
43. See M. BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY 302 (1945):
Obviously the individual or the religious body cannot make a private
definition of religious liberty and impose it upon the community. A
fortiori, the vast variety of societies, states, and moral convictions
throughout the world inevitably, and rightly, brings a further relativity
into the definition and interpretation of religious liberty.
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., sep. op.):
Religious beliefs pervade, and religious institutions have traditionally
regulated, virtually all human activity. It is postulate of American life,
reflected specifically in the First Amendment to the Constitution but
not there alone, that those beliefs and institutions shall continue, as
the needs and longings of the people shall inspire them, to exist, to
function, to grow, to wither, and to exert with whatever innate strength
they may contain their many influences upon men's conduct, free of
the dictates and directions of the state. However, this freedom does
not and cannot furnish the adherents of religious creeds entire insulation from every civic obligation. As the state's interest in the individual
becomes more comprehensive, its concerns and the concerns of religion
perforce overlap. State codes and the dictates of faith touch the same
activities. Both aim at human good, and in their respective views of
what is good for man they may concur or they may conflict. No conHeinOnline -- 4 Pub. L. Forum 341 1985

PUBLIC LA W FORUM

[Vol. 4:325

As an offspring of the first level or core activities, many
religious organizations took on tasks of education and social
welfare. 44 Government today is heavily engaged in the same tasks,
albeit out of notions of general welfare rather than religiously
motivated service. Educational and social welfare activities are the
response to or outworking of truths held by religious faith rather
than activities which deal centrally with the particulars of an
individual's perception of ultimate truth.4 5 On this second tier
stitutional command which leaves religion free can avoid this quality
of interplay.
44. By designating a second level of religious activity, it is not intended
to imply that education and social welfare by the churches are of lesser priority or value. Nor is the classification an attempt to define for religious organizations what their ministry is or should be. See Ball, Secularism: Tidal Wave of
Repression in FREEDOM AND FAITH: THE IMPACT OF LAW ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
49, 53 (Buzzard, ed. 1982) (beware ploy confining religious liberty to "religion
under the steeple"); P. BERGER AND R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 30 (1977).
The danger today is not that the churches or any one church will
take over the state. The much more real danger is that the state will
take over the functions of the church, except for the most narrowly
construed definition of religion limited to worship and religious
instruction.
Id. Accordingly, wariness must be exercised lest a classification of the activities
of religious organizations into "core" functions and those of education and
social welfare facilitate the government in co-opting the latter.
Although there is danger to religious freedom in breaking down religious
activities into "core" functions and those which in degree are more their offspring, there is greater danger in not doing so. Unless religious organizations
are willing to concede the government some limited oversight of educational
and social welfare activities, sharp and perhaps polarizing confrontations will
follow. The harvest of these clashes may be bitter fruit in the form of legal
precedent permitting governmental intervention into even the very central matters of inculcation and propagation. Religious bodies must be sensitive to large

elements of the public who are already overly cynical about the role of religion,
conditioned by highly publicized frauds and other excesses by mail-order
"ministries" and "mind-control cults." Limited government regulation can
curb many of these abuses and thereby yield an environment of public goodwill which actually enhances the free play for religious beliefs.
45. Indeed, it is only because education and social welfare are widely
held to have large secular components that government can engage in such
activities at all. If education and social welfare were largely and essentially

religious, the Establishment Clause would prohibit the state from engaging
in them. Additionally, it cannot be argued that separation of church and state
reserves an exclusive role for religious organizations in the education or social
welfare fields protected from competition with government-run programs. This
is the case, however, when it comes to matters of worship or religious inculcaHeinOnline -- 4 Pub. L. Forum 342 1985
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of religious ministry, some limited governmental interests are
proper, even absent powerful reasons of state. The state is not
totally incompetent concerning education and social welfare. The
state can be, and in America has been, largely a positive force
in promoting education and welfare. For example, a state may
legitimately require that parochial school students perform at
minimum achievement levels in such staples as math, science and
grammar in order to insure that they become literate, productive
citizens. The Supreme Court has condoned such regulation, even
though the governmental interest cannot fairly be said to be compelling, only paternalistic. 46 In contrast, government cannot
regulate the more central matters of worship, propagation, and
inculcation without delving into the very tenets of ultimate truth.
The government has no competence in such matters.
Nevertheless, the government must have a healthy sensitivity
to the distinctive religious character of this second level of ministry.
The state cannot simply treat a religious school or social welfare
ministry like its "secular counterpart. ' 4 7 A special wariness should

characterize the relationship so as not to inhibit fulfillment of a
ministr,'s purpose. The relationship should avoid entanglements
that in time may tend to absorb these agencies as quasigovernmental appendages for the promotion of state policies. In
addition to the nature of the religious practices concerned, factors
to be weighed are the substantiality of the entanglements and the
duration of the resulting church-state relationship. 48 The boundary delimiting the government's purview should be drawn far
short of the point at which the result would be the denial or coercion of sincerely held religious convictions of individual members
tion and propagation, which deal directly with ultimate truth. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 465 U.S. 574, 604 n.29, 605 n.32 (1983) (religious
schools characterized as not "purely religious" and thus unlike churches).
46. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968) (dicta)
("[A] substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the states to
insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsoryattendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of
instruction") and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (government
has strong interest in literacy of students in English language, but means chosen
to accomplish that task violated due process) with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. at 234 (Old Order Amish excluded from compulsory attendance laws
by Free Exercise Clause).
47. Cf. Ball, Secularism, supra note 44, at 56.
48. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762-63 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
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of a religious organization. The entanglement with government
becomes excessive well before the religious entity must choose
either to obey the state or follow its own religious tenets. For
example, the government has no authority over the content of
the curriculum of religious educational and social welfare agencies,
for this content reflects the philosophical or theological beliefs of
the ministry, making them quite different from their "secular
counterparts. "
Secularists object to religious groups being treated differently
from others because they see it as a privilege. This objection is
due to an incomplete understanding. The key principle of social
order at work in church-state separation is reciprocity. Only in
a distorted sense is the secularist correct to characterize as
"privilege" the exemption from general legislation given religious
organizations. For the secularist to be consistent with this
characterization, the reciprocal nature of church-state separation
requires that he or she concede that religious organizations are
also specially "burdened" by disqualification from state funding
or other government support. Thus, the secularist's initial objection to the "privilege" is offset by this mutual "burden" borne
4
by religious organizations.

9

There is no escaping the fact that the Establishment Clause
assumes the unique nature of religious organizations. We insist
that churches not be funded by government. Why? Because they
are unique, which is to say they are thought by religious adherents
to be divine in origin and nature. It is because of this very uniqueness that churches must also be free of most government
interference.
Note that the proposed Establishment Clause test permits state
intervention in exigent circumstances. Because of their temporality,
churches and other religious organizations are not immune from
wrongdoing. Their activities, therefore, cannot be totally
autonomous from the state when it comes to matters of high order,
such as health and safety. The state must have the power to
intervene in such exigent matters, even when it means overriding
50
sincerely held religious beliefs.
49. Compare Lacey, The Struggle Over Deregulation of Religiously-Affiliated
Institutions: A Classic Internal First Amendment Conflict, 26 ARiz. L. REv. 615 (1984)
(typifying secularistic arguments against exemptions).
50. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 465 U.S. 574 (racial
discrimination in education); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(child-labor laws); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Mormon polygamy).
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4.

The Special Problem of Parochial Aid

The Supreme Court's 1982-83 term witnessed the first real
doctrinal break from the ban on government aid to primary and
secondary religious schools. The Court sustained the tuition tax
deduction plan in Mueller v. Allen because the choice of "spending" the government benefit at a religious school is left entirely
in the hands of parents . 5 The Minnesota tax statute upheld in
Mueller did not have any onerous screening requirements on
religious schools. Thus, the state did not use the tuition tax deduction as a means of regulating religious schools.
What if future tax benefit plans are used as a "backdoor"
approach to control religious schools? That is, by accepting the
tax benefit does a parent or religious school thereby relinquish
all first amendment objections to administrative oversight of the
school?
The consolidated cases of Bob Jones Universiy v. United States
and Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 12 have already given
the Supreme Court's assent to tax benefits conditioned on the
absence of racial discrimination. More worrisome is Grove City
College v. Bell, 53 which hinted that the Constitution's congressional
spending power to extract regulatory compliance as a condition
of federal financial assistance is very broad.
Deep-seated in American pragmatism there is a sense that
whenever the government funds an activity it has the authority
to regulate it. Indeed, all would agree that it would be irresponsible for government to fund an activity and not exercise the
requisite control to ensure that the funds are spent for the
designated public purpose. Numerous interests are lobbying hard
and arguing persuasively that government should aid religious
schools. 5 4 Their basic argument begins with the truism that responsible education is inherently value-laden. All agree that government has a responsibility to educate its citizens. However, govern51. 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983). See Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,
105 S. Ct. 3216, 3229 n.13 (1985) (distinguishing direct aid to parochial
school from parental aid in Mueller).
52. 465 U.S. 574.
53. 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1223 (1984) (upholding prohibition on sex
discrimination in financial aid office of private college as condition of student
grants and loans).
54. See, e.g., R. MCCARTHY, J. SKILLEN & W. HARPER, DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME: GENUINE PLURALISM FOR AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1982).
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ment, at least liberal government, should not, through the control of schools, impose on students an ideology on which there
is no broad public consensus. If the inculcation of values lies initially and principally with parents, then parents must be able
to choose, free of economic coercion, the type of educational
philosophy desired for their children. This point and a belief (hotly
contested!) that civic consensus is narrow in America,55 leads one
to accept some form of government assistance to parents (or, at
least low-income parents who cannot presently afford5 6 private
schools), including those who choose religious schools.
55. Thayer S. Warshaw, on behalf of the National Council on Religion
and Public Education, takes issue with the claim that civil consensus is so
narrow in America that religiously neutral public education is impossible:
Our country is committed to pluralism and democracy, not to
an American version of totalitarianism-even under the well-intentioned
aegis of a nonsectarian "religion." Under church-state separation,
public schools are secular. That need not make them either champions
of secularism as an ideology or enemies of religion. The task for [the]
educator and others is to engage in a thoughtful, slogan-free examination of how values are (and are to be) transmitted in the public schools
of a pluralistic and democratic society.
I propose two premises for such an examination and discussion.
First, public education must avoid extremes: either of complete moral
relativism or of totalitarian moral absolutes. Certain basic moral principles seem almost universally agreed upon in our society: concern
for others, acceptance of responsibility, and personal integrity; love
of country and respect for law and order; a capacity and disposition
to be informed, logical and critical; and a few others.
Second, agreement on such principles does not mandate unanimity
in schools and classrooms with regard to two related fields: the authority
for and the application of moral principles. Teachers may differ as to
the religious or nonreligious authority for these moral universals. In
my experience, pupils rarely raise questions of authority for moral
principles. If they should do so, or if the teacher feels it pedagogically
appropriate to raise such questions, I would expect that trained and
honorable professionals would not express only their own beliefs, but
also present alternatives. ...
The process of growth in general, and of education in particular,
is a continually expanding awareness of alternatives. Equally important, differences among teachers about the specific application of
universal moral principles present to pupils vivid examples of how
pluralism and democracy are distinguished from totalitarian control
of thought and action.
39 REPORT FROM THE CAPITAL 11 (Feb. 1984) (emphasis in original).
56. The case of Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion), provides some
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Before continuing their campaign for state aid, it is incumbent on these parochial-aid interest groups to see to it that they
do not lose control over the schools' educational philosophy. Some
help may be found by a parallel to the recent case of F. C. C. v.
League of Women Voters,5 7 which held that the Free Speech and
Free Press Clauses were violated by a congressional ban against
educational broadcasting stations airing opinions or editorials on
public issues. Although the ban was tied to federal funding for
the stations, the Court would not permit .the receipt of funds to
be conditioned on waiving first amendment rights. As of yet,
however, federal courts have not applied this doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions" to the Establishment Clause.
Presently, the extent to which governmental aid may compromise
the independence of religious schools is not known.
C.

Defining "Religion"

The word "church" does not appear in the first amendment.
Rather, the amendment addresses "religion" and thereby religious
organizations. Further, the word "religion" appears only once
in the amendment and grammatically must receive the same defini-

tion for both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
In United States v. Seeger the Supreme Court broadly defined
religion as "beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or
upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all
else is ultimately dependent.' '58 Although the Seeger case concerned the interpretation of a statute, it was decided with an eye to
construing the statute consistent with the Free Exercise Clause.

Because this clause protects individual conscience, religion was
defined so as to permit its being tailored to each believer. As
unexpected (and probably unintended) support for this syllogism from the liberal
half of the Supreme Court. The plurality opinion states that the first amendment prevents a school board from removing a book from the school library
when the board's motivation is to withhold from students ideas thought objectionable. Thus Pico suggests that public schools (or at least the libraries therein)
cannot be used to shelter students from ideas simply because they are controversial. Only a small leap is needed to reach the additional point that government cannot use its schools to inculcate pupils with controversial ideas or an
ideology on which there is no civic consensus. See Gordon, Freedom of Expression and Values Inculcation in the Public School Curriculum, 13 J. L. & EDUC. 523
(1984); Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REv. 197 (1983).
57. 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
58. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
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free exercise claimants became increasingly pluralistic in their
religion, necessarily the Court's definition had to be broadened
and made flexible to continue the protection of conscience.
When this same broad and subjective definition of religion
is applied to the Establishment Clause, as grammatically it must,
it initially appears problematic. If the state is to abstain from
religious affairs, and religion by definition is broad and subjective, then one has the absurd result of government being estopped from participating in many of the activities in which it presently and quite properly engages. Examples would be education and
social welfare, activities that some consider to be religious
functions.
The definitional paradox is, however, a false one. Religion
can and should be defined the same for both clauses. However,
the danger which the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid is not
any and all state interaction with religion. This would lead to
a radically secular state. Rather, the clause is to prevent only
state involvement with religion (with each faith defining "religion"
in accord with its own understandings) that may lead to an establishment of religion. This level of interaction happens when the state
involves itself in the core religious matters of worship and the
propagation or inculcation of the sort of matters that comprise
confessional statements and creeds. Whereas the juridical definition of religion can remain broad and indeterminate, the necessity
of a clear and fixed structure in church-state relations requires
a single legal standard for drawing the line of institutional separation. The line is this: although it is impermissible for the state
to be involved in worship and in the propagation or inculcation
of the type of matters that comprise confessional or creedal
statements, the Establishment Clause is not violated when the
government's laws and actions merely reflect moral judgments arising from society's religious beliefs. 5 9
This understanding of religion is only for purposes of the first
amendment. It is not proposed as a universal or even adequate
theological definition of religion, only a definition which fulfills
the necessary jurisprudential functions of a clear and fixed legal

standard .

6

0

59. See text accompanying notes 61-62 infra.
60. Of course, the state in limited cases will be forced to be more specific
in its definition of religion, such as the determination whether an organization
is a bonafide church due a revenue code exemption or a scam to evade taxes.
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D.

Freedom of Religious Expression

The American Republic is not a sectarian state, but it is not
a radically secular government either. The power of the sovereign
lies in the first instance in "the people." The people, however,
as the ultimate repose of power are ruled by those ideas and ideals
which have captured their hearts and minds. When ideas are in
conflict, truth is to be sought by permitting unhindered debate.
Each citizen bears a heavy responsibility to contend for the truth.
The role of the liberal state is to keep the arena open for continued debate, while protecting from extinction certain inalienable
rights which may suffer at the hands of the majority.
When this marketplace of ideas produces a consensus around
a social ethos which arises out of the people's religious traditions,
the church-state separation implemented by the Establishment
Clause is not violated. To censor and exclude from public discourse
ideas which spring from religious faith would be to impose a new
and radically secular regime upon the American political system.
Popular sovereignty does not disqualify a view of law which is
both transcendent of the state and theocentric. To insert religion
into a public debate can, of course, be divisive and sometimes
imprudent. But questions of nuclear arms, the wars in Central
America, and taxes are divisive as well, and that does not give
cause to exclude them from public discourse. Nor is prudence
the test of constitutionally protected speech.
1.

Legislating Morality

What if religious expression is directed at law making? Just
how far can churches and believers go in trying to get the state
to enforce religious standards of conduct? A state may and often
does legislate concerning morality, whether it be against graft,
racism, child abuse, incest, economic exploitation, or stewardship
of the environment. There are appropriate instances for churches
and individual believers to seek by persuasion and consensus the
implementation of religiously based morality through legislation.
This may be pursued by use of the rights of religious expression
and association.
It makes little sense for secularists to concede to churches the
freedom of speech, as they must, and then to argue that the separaFor an excellent discussion on the problem of defining religion for first amendment purposes, see Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (Adams,

J., concurring in result).
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tion of church and state is violated when religious groups win
the debate leading to enactment of moral-based legislation consistent with their religious views. Were that the law, the church would
be juridically isolated from the life of its age and compelled to
be impotent. It is in effect an argument for separation from
relevance. The church-state separation of the Establishment Clause
does not disqualify the government from legislating against
immorality simply because the moral principles involved arise out
of a religious base. 61 If secularists hope to defeat moral legislation, they will have to proceed by the same means: speech,
persuasion and consensus. The state need not be neutral on matters of virtue and morality by reason of the Establishment Clause.
The clause separates church and state, but it does not silence a
church which believes it is called to speak prophetically and criticize
the government or address a matter of political ethics.
To be sure, not all morality can or should be codified into
positive law. There are limits on what legal processes can
accomplish in shaping human behavior for the better. For example,
there is little point in passing laws which cannot or will not be
enforced by the authorities. Moreover, churches should avoid any
effort to enforce a new moralism through the coercive power of
the state. Legislation defines all that is lawful, not all that is sinful. The civil and criminal law should be utilized only to restrain
acts where harmful and disorderly consequences emerge in the
62
community.
The right of free expression is limited by the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses. For example, should religious organizations ever be successful in imposing by legislation sectarian efforts
at creedal propagation or inculcation, the Establishment Clause
would be violated. Likewise, should legislation attempt to coerce
personal faith or worship, the Free Exercise Clause would be
violated.
By and large the federal courts have recognized that a church
separated from the state need not be a silent church. So long
61. If there can be any doubt concerning the matter, the Supreme Court
in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment), held that the principle of church-state separation was not violated when
legislation was adopted which was consistent with the doctrine of some churches prohibiting abortion.
62. See P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1970); J. ANDERSON, MORALITY,

LAW AND GRACE (1972).
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as religious expression is protected at the same high level as is
expression of philosophical, political, economic or artistic content,
there need be no fear for the legal rights of religious organiza63 publish, 64
tions and adherents of all persuasions to speak,
63. For cases concerning the freedom of religious speech, see Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university cannot, consistent with the
"rights of speech and association," deny student religious groups access to
facilities provided to all other recognized student groups); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (reversing conviction of Baptist minister who gave
inflammatory sermon on public street after being denied permit to hold a
meeting as a prior restraint on "the right to speak"); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (holding unconstitutional as a "previous restraint
on the right of free speech" an ordinance used to deny use of loud-speaker
in park by Jehovah's Witness); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307
(1940) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness for breach of the peace and
failure to have permit to solicit money and sell literature as contrary to free
exercise of religion and "freedom to communicate information of opinion");
cf. Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(upholding restrictions on the selling, exhibiting and distribution of printed
material at state fair as reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the
right to communicate); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574
(1942) (conviction of Jehovah's Witness upheld for violating law against
"fighting words" which did not unreasonably impinge upon the "privilege
of free speech").
64. For cases concerning the freedom of religious press, see Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (trespass conviction of Jehovah's Witness
for distribution of literature in company-owned town reversed because of
"freedom of press and religion"); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 520 (1946)
(consistent with "freedom of press and religion," state cannot punish Jehovah's
Witness engaged in distribution of literature in village owned by United States);
Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944) (license tax on sales
of literature imposed on resident minister selling religious books contrary to
the "freedom of religion"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943)
(striking down license fee required by solicitation ordinance when applied to
Jehovah's Witness selling religious literature door-to-door as contrary to the
"[flreedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion"); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's
Witness who violated a city ordinance concerning door-to-door solicitation and
distribution of handbills as invalid denial of "freedom of speech and press");
Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's
Witness under ordinance forbidding distribution of religious publications without
permit as abridging "freedom of religion, of the press and of speech"); Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943) (ordinance restricting distribution on city
street of handbills bearing religious message is restraint on "freedom of press
and religion"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (conviction of
Jehovah's Witness for canvassing without a permit as abridging "freedom of
speech and press"); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)
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assemble and associate 65 relative to matters of faith.
Even the few trouble spots concerning religious expression may
have been favorably resolved. There is cause for optimism that
Congress' passage of the Equal Access Act, 66 affording voluntary
high school religious clubs the same associational rights as other
student groups during noncurricular periods, will have reversed
court decisions to the contrary. In another example, two recent
Supreme Court opinions indicate that the "political divisiveness"
facet of the excessive entanglement test may now be toothless. In
the Court's parochial aid cases of the 1970's, the potential for
state aid to religious schools to cause political division along
denominational lines was reason for invalidating the legislation
under the Establishment Clause. 67 In Marsh v. Chambers68 and Lynch
v. Donnely69 the Court all but eliminated the political divisiveness
(municipal ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills without permit was
restraint on "freedom of press" of Jehovah's Witness).
65. For cases concerning the freedom of religious assembly, see Fowler
v. Rhode Island 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (discriminatory denial of permit to
Jehovah's Witness to hold services in public park is preferring one religious
group over others); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951)
(discriminatory denial of permit to Jehovah's Witnesses to use city park for
public gathering denied "equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of .
. . freedoms of speech and religion"). Cf. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953) (sustaining conviction of Jehovah's Witness for conducting a religious
meeting in park without a license; petitioner had failed to pursue remedy
through local court action); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(upholding conviction of group of Jehovah's Witnesses who paraded without
required permit because law was found to be precisely drawn time, place and
manner regulation fairly enforced).
66. The Equal Access Act was attached as an amendment to the Education for Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, Title VIII, 98 Stat.
1267 (1984). The constitutionality of the Equal Access Act is an issue in Bender
v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985).
67. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 623; Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-66 (1976) (plurality opinion). The political
divisiveness test has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Gaffney, Political
Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court is Sloppy History
and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980); Ball, What is Religion?,
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7, 12-13 (1979). If taken literally, the political

divisiveness test runs counter to the freedom of speech and other expressional
guarantees of religious organizations, rights the Supreme Court has already
acknowledged. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (dicta);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring),
68. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
69. 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364-65 (1984).
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inquiry by downgrading its relevance to little more than a warn70
ing that the matter should be given additional scrutiny.
2.

Moral Pluralism and the Open Society

Some are discouraging an aggressive use by churches of the
freedom to shape public opinion. They fear that moral and
religious pluralism might thereby be lost, bringing on a passing
of the American-style open society. 71 To be sure, moral pluralism
is a fact to be acknowledged, but it is not an intractable fact.
Moreover, the current moral pluralism is neither a condition to
be celebrated and maintained by the churches nor is it necessary
to ensure democracy. It is perverse to say democracy is incompatible with moral absolutes. Indeed, moral pluralism which strips
society bare of any transendent notion of right and wrong is the
surest way to trade in democracy for despotism. Growing moral
relativism actually destabilizes government, causing the state to
respond by exercising more control over citizens.7 2 Democracy
requires moral self-discipline that bridles one's use of liberty in
order to enable voluntary order. However, in the final analysis,
a church does not exist foremost to create national stability.
Rather, political order and moral reform are mere by-products
73
of the inner transformation wrought by religious faith.
The historic church was evangelistic with varying degrees of
missionary zeal. Conversion, not celebration of comparative
religion, was the marching order of the day. And widespread conversion out of free will would bring about a reduction in moral
and religious pluralism. At its root the real fear of some is that
the historic message of traditional religions will be believed and
70. Id. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor said:
"[T]he constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of the
government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness
itself."
71. See generally, Hitchcock, Competing Ethical Systems, 10 IMPRIMIS (April
1981).

72. The necessity of a socio-religious consensus undergirding and stabilizing the state's political power has been advanced by a number of writers.
See, e.g., R. NEUHAUS, supra note 4, at 60; 138 C. DAwsON, RELIGION AND
THE MODERN STATE (1940); J. MURRY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960); Bellah,
Cultural Pluralismand Religious Particularismin FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN AMERICA:
HISTORICAL RooTs, PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

33 (H. Clark, ed. 1981).
73. Littell, The Basis of Religious Liberty in Christian Belief, 6 J.
& STATE 132, 135-38 (1964).
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acted upon. To oppose the church's opportunity to express its
message, not only turns church-state separation into an artifice
to avoid moral pressure, but does so by violating the church's
first amendment expressional rights.
III.

SUMMARY

The Supreme Court has confined the application of the Free
Exercise Clause to the protection of individual conscience against
governmental abuses. This limiting construction by the Court is
necessary in order to prevent the clause from becoming a ready
excuse for anyone wanting to avoid the duties of citizenship. Thus,
the task of governing the functional separation of church and state
is properly left to the Establishment Clause. Maintaining the
integrity and independence of religious organizations requires that
government neither be involved in worship nor become an agent
for achieving creedal propagation and inculcation. This is what
it means for the state to be neutral. Moreover, this structural
separation of church and state not only guarantees an autonomous
church, but accrues to the benefit of individual religious liberty
by ensuring that one's state is not aiding a religion he or she
does not share.
Some political fragmentation along religious lines may resultindeed, likely will result-in a free society where expressional rights
are brought to bear on public policy. Churches may properly
engage in debates over political and public affairs, for they have
a right to do so as a matter of free expression and association.
Religion may be a personal matter, but it is not thereby a private
matter. For its part, the offices and machinery of government
do not betray their neutrality when moral pressure leads to legislation which is grounded in traditional religious values. So long
as the instruments of state are not marshalled on one side or the
other of sectarian efforts at worship or creedal propagation and
inculcation, the requisite neutrality has been preserved.

HeinOnline -- 4 Pub. L. Forum 354 1985

